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OVERREACH AND INNOVATION IN 
EQUALITY REGULATION 
OLATUNDE C.A. JOHNSON† 
ABSTRACT 
  At a time of heightened concern about agency overreach, this Article 
highlights a less appreciated development in agency equality 
regulation. Moving beyond traditional bureaucratic forms of 
regulation, civil rights agencies in recent years have experimented with 
new forms of regulation to advance inclusion. This new “inclusive 
regulation” can be described as more open ended, less coercive, and 
more reliant on rewards, collaboration, flexibility, and interactive 
assessment than traditional modes of civil rights regulation. This 
Article examines the power and limits of this new inclusive regulation 
and suggests a framework for increasing the efficacy of these new 
modes of regulation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This Symposium was inspired by a sense of possibility that 
administrative law and federal agencies might play a central role in 
advancing equality and social inclusion.1 This possibility reflected what 
seemed to be a growing empirical reality. Over the past decade, federal 
agencies have increasingly taken on the antidiscrimination project, 
actively promulgating regulations and guidance to advance inclusion in 
areas such as housing, education, and employment.2 This unleashing of 
administrative power has roots in prior presidential administrations,3 
but it is partially explained by two terms of a presidential 
administration favorable to an active administrative state and to 
particular civil rights goals. This emphasis on agencies as a source of 
civil rights norms has occurred alongside a gridlocked Congress that 
has struggled to respond to a changing civil rights landscape.4 It occurs 
 
 1. I use the term “inclusion” to reference goals that extend beyond nondiscrimination to 
include the advancement of participation and opportunity for groups or individuals that face 
systemic barriers. These barriers may be based on identity categories such as gender, ethnicity, 
disability, or race but may also include barriers such as poverty or geographic isolation that are 
not typically associated with an antidiscrimination or civil rights framework. 
 2. For examples of these agency actions, see infra notes 37, 46, 56, 69 and accompanying 
text. 
 3. See generally Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality 
Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2012) (describing regulatory initiatives to 
promote civil rights through the administrations of Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, Clinton, and 
George W. Bush). 
 4. For instance, Congress has been unable to enact protections against discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. See Equality Act, S. 1858, 114th Cong. (2015); 
Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015). According to the Washington Times, the most recent 
bills stood “no chance of passage” in the current Republican-controlled Congress. Juan A. 
Lozano & David Crary, Showdown in Houston over LGBT Nondiscrimination Ordinance,  
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/25/showdown-in-
houston-over-lgbt-nondiscrimination-or [https://perma.cc/RX7W-DFXS]. In this vacuum, the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has interpreted “sex” discrimination 
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to extend to certain forms of discrimination based on 
an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity. What You Should Know About EEOC and 
the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm [https://
perma.cc/UFG2-HRR7]. One of the most prominent examples of administrative action as a 
response to a gridlocked Congress is President Obama’s executive action providing temporary 
immigration relief for certain categories of undocumented immigrants, an area of law beyond the 
scope of this Article. For a discussion of the legality of these executive immigration actions, see 
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at a time in which the limits of private enforcement and judicial 
remedies in addressing contemporary problems of exclusion have 
increasingly become apparent. Certain legal scholars have embraced 
the role of administrative agencies in regulating civil rights under the 
rubric of “administrative constitutionalism,” a framework that 
celebrates agency interpretation of landmark statutes to advance 
fundamental principles.5 More generally, scholars provide accounts of 
administrative agencies as enduring sources of norms that can rival 
courts.6 They offer theories of entrenchment as a counter to fears that 
positive administrative regulation is easily unwound by changes in the 
executive.7 
This Symposium represents an opportunity to take stock of these 
agency-driven equality initiatives and to contemplate new directions. 
One might always have worried about outsize faith in administrative 
agencies, as opposed to courts or legislatures, for advancing equality 
goals. Administrative agencies might be vital to filling gaps and 
deliberating with interest groups,8 but administrative action might also 
be seen as second best, a stopgap where legislation could not be 
achieved. Many of the administrative directives that one might 
celebrate lack private enforcement, depriving those who seek to 
advance civil rights goals of courts as an avenue for implementation.  
In the wake of a new administration in 2017, the role of 
administrative agencies in equality law seems suddenly unclear. 
Transitions from Democratic to Republican administrations are often 
 
generally Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration 
Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87 (2016).  
 5. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1898 
(2013) (providing as an example the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
(HUD) promulgation of regulations implementing a disparate impact standard under the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA)); Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. 
L. REV. 519, 523 (2015).  
 6. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: 
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33 (2010) (providing a paradigmatic account of 
“administrative constitutionalism”); Metzger, supra note 5, at 1898 (rooting “administrative 
constitutionalism” in the “central role that the modem administrative state plays in our 
constitutional system today”); Ross, supra note 5, at 523 (arguing that “constitutional adaptation” 
to changing social contexts is necessary and that administrative constitutionalism can 
“supplement other forms of adaptation that primarily occur in courts”). 
 7. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 6, at 7–8, 12–22, 127–32 (describing the 
entrenchment of administrative norms through deliberation and administrative implementation). 
 8. See id. at 29–33 (describing administrative agency interaction with social movements and 
the process of dialogic deliberation between branches through which emerge “new fundamental 
principles and policies”).  
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accompanied by less vigorous civil rights enforcement.9 The future is 
more uncertain today than in the usual partisan transition. The current 
transition features a President with policy commitments that are not 
well delineated and that are shifting even as one writes. To the extent 
that one can predict from recent appointments and statements, the 
future of administratively enforced and generated civil rights rules 
seems bleak.10  
 
 9. As an example, over the last three decades civil rights advocates and political figures 
have faulted the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for failing to enforce civil rights laws under 
Republican administrations. See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 211, 212–24 (2008) (claiming that the George W. Bush administration 
politicized enforcement decisions in the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division and failed to vigorously 
enforce the law in voting and employment discrimination); Charlie Savage, Report Examines Civil 
Rights Enforcement During Bush Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at A26 (describing the results 
of a report by the General Accounting Office documenting the George W. Bush administration’s 
failure to bring enforcement actions involving race and gender discrimination); LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE, Why Reynolds Lost, CIV. RTS. MONITOR (Aug. 1985), http://www.civilrights.org/
monitor/august1985/art2p1.html [https://perma.cc/S6FK-8TEK] (arguing that the Civil Rights 
Division, when led by Reagan appointee Brad Reynolds, had “the worst civil rights record of any 
administration in more than half a century—in education, housing, voting, employment, disability 
rights, and women’s rights”).  
 10. As an example, incoming Secretary of HUD Ben Carson has previously stated that he 
opposes the Obama administration’s fair housing rules, which are discussed later in this Article. 
For further discussion of the rules regarding disparate impact and affirmatively furthering  
fair housing, see infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. See Ben S. Carson, Experimenting with 
Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-housing-rules-try-to-accomplish [https://perma.cc/Q3GR-
XRFU] (characterizing the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) rule as “socialism” 
and misguided “social engineering”). In his confirmation hearing, Carson stated in response to 
questioning about the AFFH rule that he opposed the “central dictation to people’s lives.” See 
Nomination of Dr. Benjamin Carson: Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs United States Senate, 115th Cong. 14 (2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
115shrg24428/pdf/CHRG-115shrg24428.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKS4-DVZR]. In addition, it is 
unclear whether the incoming leadership of the DOJ will vigorously enforce civil rights laws. The 
Senate confirmed the U.S. Attorney General over strong opposition from civil rights advocates 
and over 1100 law professors. See Eric Lichtblau & Matt Flegenheimer, Jeff Sessions  
Confirmed as Attorney General Capping Bitter Battle, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/jeff-sessions-attorney-general-confirmation.html [https
://perma.cc/C4M8-7TUK]; Sari Horwitz, More than 1,100 Law School Professors Nationwide 
Oppose Sessions’s Nomination as Attorney General, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/more-than-1100-law-school-professors-nationwide-
oppose-sessionss-nomination-as-attorney-general/2017/01/03/dbf55750-d1cc-11e6-a783-cd3fa950
f2fd_story.html?utm_term=.1def7d588423 [https://perma.cc/SE6F-5PFR] (noting opposition 
based in part on Sessions’s record of pursuing prosecutions against civil rights activists for alleged 
voting fraud in the 1980s, and his opposition to legislative efforts to protect women and LGBT 
individuals from discrimination); Letter from the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human 
Rights to Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, Senate Minority Leader,  
Chuck Grassley, Senator, and Patrick Leahy, Senator (Dec. 1, 2016), http://civilrightsdocs.info/
pdf/policy/letters/2016/Sessions-Nomination-12-1-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z794-6XDU] (raising 
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For this reason, this Article may be more elegiac than initially 
envisioned. The aim of the Article is to capture the possibilities of civil 
rights regulation, even while grappling with the resistance agency 
regulation engenders. Civil rights agencies once decried for doing 
nothing are now implicated as perhaps doing too much. At a time of 
heightened concern about agency overreach, the Article aims to 
highlight a less appreciated development in agency equality regulation. 
In this development, civil rights regulation is not simply deploying 
traditional bureaucratic forms of regulation such as prohibitions and 
conditional spending. Agencies are also experimenting with new forms 
of regulation that might in theory be more palatable to those skeptical 
of traditional top-down regulation as well as to reformers looking for 
effective strategies to advance inclusion.  
Critics have long faulted civil rights agencies for regulatory 
overreach but these critiques became increasingly clamorous even 
before the 2016 election. Academic commentators charge federal 
agencies with bureaucratic regulation of innocent sexual conduct;11 
employers, courts, and Congress contest the legitimacy of agency 
efforts to prohibit discrimination against individuals with arrest and 
conviction records;12 and recent federal agency actions on gender-
identity discrimination have prompted a showdown with several 
states.13 The aforementioned agency actions may be novel; but the 
complaints raise familiar concerns in the administrative law and civil 
rights arena regarding transparency, public participation, and the 
proper role of agencies in statutory implementation.  
Today, these concerns about bureaucratic overreach are taking 
place even as novel forms of regulation by civil rights agencies have 
emerged that might be subject to the converse criticism. The traditional 
model of civil rights enforcement centers on top-down, bureaucratic 
 
concerns about Sessions’s record on voting rights, gender equity, and LGBT rights, among other 
areas). Although the DOJ does not itself promulgate the types of regulations and guidance 
discussed in this Article, its Civil Rights Division plays a role in coordinating regulatory activity 
involving particular civil rights statutes. See, e.g., Coordination of Enforcement of Non-
Discrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.401–415 (2011) (detailing the role 
of the DOJ in coordinating Title VI implementation across federal agencies). 
 11. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 
881 (2016). 
 12. For further discussion on employers’, courts’, and Congress’s pushback against 
prohibiting discrimination of individuals with arrest and conviction records, see infra notes 46–50 
and accompanying text. 
 13. For further discussion of lawsuits between federal agencies and states on gender-identity 
discrimination, see infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement, specifically prohibitions on discrimination enforced 
through private enforcement in courts or agencies14 or through 
termination of funding in federal spending programs.15 At the federal 
level, civil rights agencies are increasingly using forms of regulation 
that can be described as open ended, less coercive, and more reliant on 
rewards, collaboration, and interactive assessment than traditional 
modes of civil rights regulation. Examples include competitive grant 
programs by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) that reward 
programs that effectively train women and minorities in 
underrepresented industries, as well as partnerships by federal 
agencies that encourage state and local efforts to build affordable 
housing and redesign transportation infrastructure in a manner that 
operates to combat, rather than exacerbate, racial and economic 
segregation.16 These programs rely not just on the “stick” of federal 
fund termination but also on “carrots” and grant incentives. Even 
regulations that appear to take the familiar form of conditional 
spending, such as the recently promulgated agency guidelines requiring 
grantees to affirmatively further fair housing, place emphasis on 
processes for developing new solutions aiming to catalyze federal 
partnerships with states and other grantees and encourage self-
assessment toward collaborative problem solving.  
This Article refers to these new regulations as “inclusive 
regulation” to capture three aspects. First, they rely on a less coercive 
model of regulation. Instead, the model draws on the rhetoric of 
innovation in the current zeitgeist, one that values self-regulation, 
crowd-sourced and evidence-based solutions, and creative disruption 
of existing models.17 These regulations also are resonant of ideas in 
administrative law over the last two decades that emphasize regulation 
through collaboration and cooperation with states, localities, and other 
regulated entities; regulation as problem-solving; and the potentially 
catalyzing role of subsidizing innovation.18 Though it may be familiar 
 
 14. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (granting 
individuals the right to bring suit after exhausting claims with the EEOC). 
 15. See, e.g., id. tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (listing processes for fund termination after a 
finding of noncompliance). 
 16. For a description of grant making in the areas of labor and housing, see infra notes 91–
94 and accompanying text. 
 17. For a description of features of this new, inclusive regulation, see infra notes 91–111 and 
accompanying text. 
 18. See, e.g., Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building 
the Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 297, 299–303, 342–48 
(providing justification for increased deployment of collaborative governance and proposing a 
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in other regulatory contexts, this mode of regulation is less familiar in 
the civil rights context, which has depended on prohibitions and 
traditional bureaucratic use of federal power.19 Second, they seek to 
further “inclusion,” by which I mean they address barriers based not 
just on identity discrimination but also those based on other factors 
such as poverty and geography.20 In addition, rather than simply 
preventing exclusion, they aim to promote inclusion and opportunity 
for traditionally disadvantaged individuals and communities.21 Third, 
they depend on regulatory power to issue guidance or rules, rather than 
on adjudication in courts or agencies.22  
At a time of concern about too much administrative power 
exercised by civil rights agencies, one might legitimately wonder 
whether these administrative initiatives proceed too far in the other 
direction by being insufficiently coercive. These directives may thus 
become susceptible to the critique that they lack adequate enforcement 
and oversight mechanisms, and—because they depend on self-
assessments—risk creating a nonuniform, patchwork civil rights 
regime.23 My contribution to this Symposium considers the potential 
and the limits of this emerging civil rights regulatory model and 
suggests a framework for increasing the efficacy of these new modes of 
regulation in a context of heightened concern about agency overreach. 
Part I begins with the current moment of concern about civil rights 
overreach against the backdrop of the countervailing concern that civil 
rights agencies lack the tools, design, and political will to effectively 
implement civil rights goals. Part II makes the case for rethinking civil 
rights regulatory power given the challenges facing the current civil 
 
legal framework for achieving the goals of accountability, efficiency, transparency, participation, 
and collaboration); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 3–7, 21–31, 33–62 (1997) (proposing a normative model of collaborative 
governance and providing examples from the environmental law context).  
 19. For examples of civil rights statutes that deploy federal power to prohibit discrimination 
or regulate through the threat of funding termination, see supra notes 14–15. 
 20. For an example of such regulations, see the AFFH regulation, infra notes 105–06. 
 21. This is akin to promoting integration rather than just remedying segregation. For further 
discussion of normative frameworks that seek to go beyond antidiscrimination and instead further 
more capacious goals such as participation and opportunity, see Susan Sturm, The Architecture of 
Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 249 
(2006) (calling for new frameworks in the area of workplace equality that “expand[] beyond the 
anti-discrimination paradigm that has shaped intervention over the last thirty years”). 
 22. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 1345–49, 1378, 1407 (describing the civil rights adjudicative 
model in courts and in agencies). 
 23. For a critique of fair housing rules as lacking sufficiently vigorous enforcement 
mechanisms, see infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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rights enforcement regime, including the general limits of a prohibitory 
antidiscrimination approach. Part II then introduces the range of 
emerging inclusive regulation by civil rights agencies, defining the new 
regulation by three important features: (1) reliance on grants and other 
voluntary, opt-in, competitive forms of regulation; (2) the disruption of 
current boundaries between agencies and between traditional 
compliance-based enforcement and regulation; and (3) public 
participation as a catalyst for developing solutions and promoting 
compliance and enforcement. Part II also presents an account of why 
these forms of regulation might be emanating at this moment, arguing 
that they are reactions to long-standing critiques of civil rights 
bureaucracy as well as an attempt to retool administrative agencies to 
better address both developing as well as embedded problems of 
exclusion. Part III considers the future and the potential efficacy of this 
mode of regulation, given the persistent critique of civil rights 
bureaucratic power, and the converse critique that this regulatory form 
is insufficiently directive to meaningfully advance inclusionary goals.  
I.  INCLUSIONARY OVERREACH? 
Claims of overreach by civil rights agencies seem suddenly 
ubiquitous. As civil rights agencies use administrative power to 
respond to a set of pressing and emerging problems—including sexual 
assault on campus, racial segregation in housing, and the consequences 
of mass incarceration—resistance is evident from many quarters. 
Arguments that civil rights agencies are exceeding their authority are 
advanced by entities such as states, private-sector businesses, members 
of Congress, and critics in the academy.24 Courts have joined the fray, 
in key instances upholding challengers’ claims and enjoining recent 
administrative guidance and regulations.25  
These challenges and criticisms take a familiar form, combining 
concerns about process, mode, and regulatory goals. Challengers 
question whether agencies have overstepped their roles, the adequacy 
of their deliberation and transparency, and the normative legitimacy of 
what agencies are trying to do. Although it has become fashionable in 
the legal academy to celebrate agencies’ role as norm entrepreneurs,26 
these more recent critiques cast agency action in a more dubious light. 
 
 24. See infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 26. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 6, at 19; Metzger, supra note 5, at 1901. 
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Agencies’ role as entrepreneurial innovators bumps against a familiar 
strain in American governance that questions the power and legitimacy 
of civil rights agencies.  
A. Criticism of Agency Overreach 
Among the agencies most subject to scrutiny and challenge in 
recent years has been the U.S. Department of Education (DOE), in 
particular for its regulatory activities related to the issue of campus 
sexual assault. The DOE’s 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter to higher-
education institutions, which offered “significant guidance” specifying 
the obligations of higher-education institutions pursuant to Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972 to respond to sexual harassment 
and violence claims, is the provocation.27 The guidance purports to 
make no new law but simply to clarify how the DOE will interpret Title 
IX when faced with evaluating complaints by alleged victims about the 
adequacy of schools’ procedures for responding to complaints.28 
Nevertheless, schools, political leaders, and members of the public 
have charged that the 2011 letter, and ensuing guidance and pamphlets, 
exceeds the DOE’s statutory power and fails to incorporate the views 
of the public and regulated entities. Three lawsuits to date challenge 
the legality of the DOE’s guidance, claiming that it violates the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it was issued without 
notice and comment.29  
 
 27. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleagues (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ9J-WTX9] [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter]. 
The letter stemmed from the DOE’s enforcement of Title IX, which forbids discrimination on the 
basis of “sex,” and the resulting court-established jurisprudence that holds that Title IX forbids 
peer-on-peer sexual harassment. Specifically, the guidance requires that schools have certain 
procedures in place to investigate claims of sexual harassment and violence including notice, 
staffing, and particular grievance procedures. Id. Further, the guidance specifies the requirements 
for how investigations should be conducted, including requiring prompt resolution. Id. Hearings 
and investigations should be governed on a “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Id. 
Finally, the guidance offers proactive efforts that schools should “consider” to prevent sexual 
assaults on campus and to respond effectively. Id.  
 28. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON 
TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-
201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z2F-4KDE]. 
 29. See Amended Complaint at 3, 21, 25, Doe v. Lhamon, No. 16-cv-01158-RC (D.D.C. Aug. 
15, 2016) (including in a complaint by a University of Virginia law student an allegation that the 
Dear Colleague letter violates the APA by promulgating requirements without notice and 
comment and by mandating a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in on-campus 
adjudications of sexual assault claims); Complaint at 17, Ehrhart v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-
cv-01302-SCJ (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2016) (documenting a suit by a Georgia representative claiming 
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Even those who purport to share the goals of reducing sexual 
assault on campus are asking whether the DOE has gone too far.30 
Critics ask whether the DOE should, as matter of both law and policy, 
have had greater public participation and formally adhered to the APA 
notice-and-comment procedures, which serve to ensure public input 
and reasoned deliberation.31 Commentators also raise questions about 
the substance of the rule, most frequently whether the DOE had a basis 
for adopting the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and 
whether the rules themselves are sufficiently protective of the due 
process rights of the accused.32 Some commentators build on this 
argument to raise a more generalized concern about bureaucratic 
overreach,33 an argument that is resonant of long-standing critiques of 
the exercise of power by civil rights agencies.34 In this vein, two scholars 
 
that the DOE violated the APA by issuing the Dear Colleague letter without notice and 
comment); Complaint and Jury Demand at 48–49, Neal v. Colo. State Univ.–Pueblo, No. 16-cv-
00873-WYD (D. Co. Apr. 19, 2016) (including in a complaint by a Colorado State University–
Pueblo student an allegation that the DOE violated the APA by evading the requisite notice-and-
comment procedure). The Doe v. Lhamon case was spearheaded by the Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education. See Mission, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC., 
https://www.thefire.org/about-us/mission [https://perma.cc/F2M8-Q8QU]. Most universities have 
not directly resisted the DOE guidance, but a higher-education institution subject to DOE 
regulation did join one of the lawsuits in August 2016. See generally Amended Complaint, supra 
(involving Oklahoma Wesleyan University as a plaintiff in the suit against the DOE). 
 30. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. 
GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-
sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html [https://perma.cc/5W
MA-X6ZF]; David Rudovsky et al., Open Letter from Members of the Penn Law School Faculty: 
Sexual Assault Complaints: Protecting Complainants and the Accused Students at Universities, 
PHILLY.COM (Feb. 18, 2015), http://media.philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Z7XK-TTTN]. 
 31. Relatedly, some commentators question whether higher-education institutions have the 
capacity to investigate and adjudicate sexual assault claims. See Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes 
Means Yes”: An Essay on University Policies Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 388 (2015). 
 32. See Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual 
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 62 (2013) (“[T]he Letter 
institutes . . . procedural reforms of campus sexual assault trials that will lead to increased 
convictions, irrespective of an accused student’s guilt or innocence.”); Tamara Rice Lave, Campus 
Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why Universities Should Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 915, 946–56 (2016) (arguing that universities should adopt alternative remedies for 
addressing claims of sexual assault including “restorative justice” and that claims that must be 
adjudicated should adopt the higher “clear and convincing evidence” standard). 
 33. For an example of the concern regarding the scope of the DOE’s Title IX guidance, see 
infra note 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 34. Fearing federal administrative power, members of congress successfully sought changes 
to early versions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to weaken the power of the EEOC to enforce 
Title VII. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
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in a recent piece critique the DOE for launching the “sex 
bureaucracy,” one in which “the federal bureaucracy is now regulating 
sex itself.”35 The fault lies, according to this account, with how power is 
exercised by agencies (the use of “bureaucratic tools” and the creation 
of “mini bureaucracies within nongovernmental institutions to 
administer these procedural obligations”) and with what agencies are 
now doing (“the federal bureaucracy is now regulating sex itself”).36 In 
this sense, the DOE’s action has unleashed familiar and persistent 
concerns about the power of civil rights agencies in particular to 
unsettle relations that are more properly the domain of individuals, 
families, or local communities.  
The DOE’s regulatory actions with regard to preventing 
discrimination based on a student’s sexual identity have provoked 
similar concerns. In May 2016, the DOE issued a Dear Colleague letter 
propounding significant “guidance,” that “clarifies” that the DOE 
treats a student’s gender identity as a student’s sex for purposes of Title 
IX,37 prompting pushback from some states and local schools districts.38 
Specifically, the Dear Colleague letter on gender identity affirms that 
Title IX requires equal access to educational programs and activities, 
and it specifies that, in creating identification documents and 
determining use of traditionally sex-segregated facilities such as 
bathrooms, schools should treat students consistent with their gender 
identity.39 Echoing challenges to the sexual assault guidance, Texas and 
ten other states challenged the rules claiming that the 2016 guidance 
misinterpreted Title IX and failed to adhere to APA requirements.40 
 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 117–19 (2010) (describing these legislative changes). In other domains, 
political leaders and regulated entities have pushed back against federal agencies that have sought 
to promote integration. See generally CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS (2006) (describing 
resistance to HUD’s desegregation efforts during the Nixon administration).  
 35. Gersen & Suk, supra note 11, at 883. 
 36. Id. at 883–84. Professors Jacob Gersen and Jeannie Suk argue that the effect of the 
DOE’s activity is to regulate “ordinary sex”—“voluntary adult sexual conduct that does not harm 
others.” Id. at 885. 
 37. See Letter from Catherine Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office of Civil 
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Colleague (May 13, 2016) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter on 
Transgender Students].  
 38. For a description of legal challenges to the Title IX guidance, see infra note 40. 
 39. Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, supra note 37, at 7 (citing 34 C.F.R. 
§ 106.33 (2016)).  
 40. See Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 815–16, 819 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (order 
granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 16-11534 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2016). Plaintiffs 
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In late August 2016, a district court granted a nationwide injunction 
preventing enforcement of the guidance.41 In a contrary ruling, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the DOE’s guidance, 
holding that the interpretations were based on the DOE’s valid 
regulations and that the agency was entitled to deference in the 
interpretation of these regulations.42 The Supreme Court initially 
agreed to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision,43 but after the Trump 
administration withdrew the guidance,44 the Court remanded the case 
back to the Fourth Circuit.45 
Apart from the DOE, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s (EEOC) regulatory actions have similarly faced legal 
challenges and political opposition. The EEOC in 2012 promulgated 
 
also include a school district in Alabama, two school districts in Arizona, and the governor of 
Maine. Siding with the challengers, the district court rejected the DOE and other defendants’ 
contention that the Dear Colleague letter and other documents were mere guidance that did not 
confer any rights or carry the force of law. Id. at 836. According to the district court, the guidelines 
were final agency action under the APA: they represented a “consummation” of the agency’s 
decisionmaking process. Id. at 824 (quoting Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 
755–56 (5th Cir. 2011)). According to the district court, the guidance had practical legal 
consequence since the agency’s view of the law could force the regulated party “either to alter its 
conduct, or expose itself to potential liability.” Id. (quoting Texas v. EEOC, 827 F.3d 372, 383 
(5th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, vacated, 838 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2016). The 
district court reasoned that the Dear Colleague letter was in effect a legislative rule, not merely 
an interpretive statement, and thus should have gone through the APA notice-and-comment 
process. See id. at 830. Finally, the court held that the DOE’s guidance documents were not 
entitled to deference because they contradicted the plain meaning of the statute and were 
inconsistent with existing, unambiguous regulations. Id. at 832–33. 
 41. See id. at 836.  
 42. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 369 (Oct. 28, 2016) (No. 16-273), vacated and remanded, No. 19-273, 2017 WL 
855755 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017) (mem.). 
 43. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s determination that the regulation 
upon which the guidance was based was ambiguous, and thus the DOE interpretation was entitled 
to Auer deference unless the regulation was plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. 
Id. at 719, 721 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). Applying this standard, the 
Fourth Circuit found the DOE’s interpretation inconsistent with the “varying physical, 
psychological, and social aspects . . . included in the [dictionary definition of the] term ‘sex.’” Id. 
at 722. The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit 
decision. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (Oct. 28, 2016) (No. 
16-273). 
 44. Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office of Civil Rights, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., and T.E. Wheeler II, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Colleague (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/941
551/download [https://perma.cc/5D2B-H7QN] (withdrawing a statement of policy and guidance 
on transgender students).  
 45. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, No. 19-273, 2017 WL 855755, at *1 
(U.S. Mar. 6, 2017) (mem.) (vacating and remanding to the Fourth Circuit). 
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guidance stating that an employer’s reliance on arrest and conviction 
status as the basis of an employment decision may in some instances 
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s prohibitions on 
discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.46 The guidance 
recommends a set of best practices and “safe harbors” for employers 
to follow to avoid liability.47 Members of Congress have sharply 
questioned the EEOC on its guidance in oversight hearings and have 
introduced three bills that would prevent the EEOC from enforcing 
this guidance.48 Although the congressional oversight and activity has 
not so far resulted in legislation, a federal appellate court allowed 
litigation brought by the state of Texas challenging the EEOC’s 
guidance to go forward.49  
B. Criticism of Agency Goals and Process 
For observers of civil rights agencies, these claims—made by 
scholars, regulated entities, and members of Congress—that agencies 
 
 46. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in 
Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, No. 915.002, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest
_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/S2QN-59EA] (discussing potential violations of Title VII’s 
disparate treatment and disparate impact provisions). 
 47. See generally id. (recommending proper screening, training, and confidentiality 
procedures). 
 48. See, e.g., H.R. 4959, EEOC Transparency and Accountability Act, H.R. 5422,  
Litigation Oversight Act of 2014, and H.R. 5423, Certainty in Enforcement Act of 2014: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 
113th Cong. 7 (2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg89724/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg
89724.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJD3-7SRD] (“[T]he agency’s edict restricting the use of criminal 
background checks is putting people in harm’s way . . . .” (statement of Rep. Tim Walberg, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Workforce Protections)); The Regulatory and Enforcement Priorities of 
the EEOC: Examining the Concerns of Stakeholders: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce 
Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 113th Cong. 1 (2014) (examining recent 
EEOC actions particularly related to concerns with “policies that many believe are not in the best 
interest of workers and employers,” including 2012 guidance regarding the use of criminal 
background checks in employer hiring (statement of Rep. Tim Walberg, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Workforce Protections)).  
 49. Specifically, Texas filed a lawsuit to enjoin the EEOC from enforcing its guidance, 
claiming that the EEOC’s guidance on arrest and conviction was a binding substantive 
interpretation of Title VII, which was forbidden by the statute, and in violation of the APA. After 
a district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in June 2016 reversed, holding that Texas had standing. See Texas v. EEOC, 827 F.3d 372, 
377 (5th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, vacated, 838 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2016). 
Though the EEOC lacks power to bring direct enforcement actions against state employers, see 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012), the court found that failure to conform with the safe harbors in 
the guidance might cause the EEOC to investigate a state and refer it to the U.S. Attorney 
General to pursue litigation, see EEOC, 827 F.3d at 383–84. 
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are exercising too much power are striking. A long-standing complaint 
of civil rights reformers is that agencies lack regulatory power and fail 
to rely effectively on the powers they have. Yet the current claims 
suggest that the deployment of these relatively weak forms of 
regulatory power, such as guidance documents, are nonetheless 
perceived by some as too intrusive.  
The EEOC, for instance, lacks substantive rulemaking power. 
Title VII, the fair-employment provisions, grants the EEOC power to 
issue procedural regulations but not the power to issue substantive 
regulations defining the ambit of Title VII.50 This impotence was the 
congressional choice that prevailed, a choice with the precise goal of 
limiting federal power over employers.51 For this reason, the EEOC 
guidance does not typically garner strong deference from the Court.52 
Similarly, while the DOE has formal regulatory power, it often acts 
through guidance rather than formal rulemaking. Functionally, the 
agency uses guidance to give clarity to regulated authorities as to the 
DOE’s interpretation of its spending clause statutes—in the case of 
sexual assault and gender identity in schools, Title IX. Civil rights 
reformers have long faulted agencies for failing to enforce their 
authority to terminate funding under these programs or to effectively 
supervise grantees.53 Yet the legal challenges to these weak forms of 
regulation must depend on the notion that guidance has legal 
consequences. As a district court recently found in the context of the 
 
 50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a). 
 51. See generally FARHANG, supra note 34, at 117–19 (describing the formal weakness of the 
EEOC and the legislative choices that shaped it); ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHAPING RACE 
POLICY: THE UNITED STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 162–63 (2005) (explaining the 
legislative compromise that led to the allotment of powers held by the EEOC). 
 52. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1941–45 (2006). As Professor Melissa Hart has noted, even where the 
EEOC has formal rulemaking power, as for procedural regulations or for certain provisions in 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12116, the Court has not consistently 
afforded the agency Chevron deference. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: EXAMINING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VI AND 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898, at 1–5 (2016) (summarizing findings that the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has been unable to effectively respond to Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 environmental-justice complaints); Michael Allen, No Certification, No Money; The 
Revival of Civil Rights Obligations in HUD Funding Programs, 78 PLAN. COMMISSIONERS J. 16, 
16 (2010) (documenting HUD’s history of failing to enforce certification rules to promote 
integrated housing).  
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EEOC, the agency’s view of the law could force the regulated party 
“either to alter its conduct, or expose itself to potential liability.”54  
One could say that these challenges to the legitimacy of agency 
action are simply an attempt to shift civil rights agencies away from 
relying on forms of regulation (like guidance) that lack the 
transparency and formal indicia of reasoned decisionmaking that are 
present when an agency deploys notice-and-comment rulemaking. The 
failure to safeguard against arbitrary administrative action is a 
consistent concern raised by academic critics of the DOE’s actions in 
particular.55 From the perspective of understanding the broader 
political critique of civil rights agencies, however, it is worth noting that 
these legitimacy concerns are not confined to agencies that fail to 
deploy notice-and-comment rulemaking. Even where civil rights 
agencies are exercising their rulemaking power and complying with 
agency procedures, challengers raise questions about the process and 
goal of regulation.  
A recent example of a challenge to the legitimacy of civil rights 
regulation is found in criticisms of the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s (HUD) 2015 rulemaking delineating the Fair 
Housing Act’s (FHA) requirement that federal agencies and grantees 
“affirmatively further fair housing.”56 The statutory requirement had 
gone largely undefined for the forty-five years since the passage of the 
FHA until a fair housing group challenged a county grantee for failing 
to meaningfully comply with the statutory requirement.57 The lawsuit 
prompted HUD to strengthen its regulation and to delineate what is 
required of grantees. Despite the statutory directive and the use of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, groups have criticized HUD’s 
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) regulation as an 
infringement on state and local power and faulted the regulations for 
engaging in “social engineering.”58 Members of Congress have 
 
 54. See EEOC, 827 F.3d. at 383. 
 55. For the critique of the DOE’s misuse of its regulatory power, see supra notes 32–36. 
 56. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (July 16, 2015) 
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903) (“Through this final rule, HUD 
provides HUD program participants with an approach to more effectively and efficiently 
incorporate into their planning processes the duty to affirmatively further the purposes and 
policies of the Fair Housing Act, which is title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.”). 
 57. See United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 
548, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 58. See Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Where Should a Poor Family Live?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
5,  2015),   http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/opinion/where-should-a-poor-family-live.html 
[https://perma.cc/CM8Q-RPU7] (describing claims of opponents that HUD’s AFFH rule 
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introduced measures to curtail HUD’s spending to enforce the 
requirement, which have so far not advanced. 
HUD’s 2014 regulations on disparate impact provide another 
example. At this writing, homeowner’s insurance industry groups are 
challenging HUD’s disparate impact regulations59 as unlawful.60 This 
challenge persists even after the Supreme Court, in its 2015 decision in 
Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. (ICP),61 affirmed that the FHA’s 
antidiscrimination mandate extends to unjustified disparate impacts.62 
As the ICP case did not address the validity of HUD’s rule, it provided 
a sufficient window for this subsequent lawsuit claiming that key 
aspects of HUD’s regulations exceeded the scope of the statute.63 
These scholarly, political, and legal challenges to agency action 
question both the process of civil rights regulation and its goals. On one 
level, the process critiques posit that the regulatory actions proceeded 
with insufficient public input and deliberation and fail to conform to 
the requirements of the APA. But the critiques embed a broader 
 
constitutes “social engineering”); see also Jeremy Carl, The Obama Administration Thinks 
Hillary’s Hometown is Racist: Does Congress Agree?, NAT’L REV. (May 18, 2016, 9:42 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/435531/obama-administration-thinks-hillarys-hometown-
racist-does-congress-agree [https://perma.cc/KY25-XB4G] (“AFFH undercuts the independence 
of suburbs, towns, and small cities by forcing them to make up for supposed ‘imbalances’ in the 
racial, ethnic, and class composition of their greater metropolitan regions.”). 
 59. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,272. HUD’s regulations 
interpret the FHA prohibition on discrimination to extend to actions with an unjustified disparate 
impact on a protected group, and they provide a burden-shifting framework for proving 
discrimination in courts and in agency adjudication. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 60. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. HUD, 74 F. Supp. 3d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2014), vacated and remanded, 
No. 14-5321, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16894 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2015) (per curiam). 
 61. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 
(2015). 
 62. See id. at 2510 (holding that the FHA’s text and purpose supported disparate impact 
liability). 
 63. Prior to Inclusive Communities Project, the district court in American Insurance held that 
HUD had exceeded its statutory authority in interpreting the FHA to extend to “disparate 
impact.” Am. Ins. Ass’n, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 32 (finding that HUD’s disparate impact rule exceeded 
the agency’s statutory authority). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the 
American Insurance decision after Inclusive Communities Project. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. HUD, 
No. 14-5321, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16894 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2015) (per curiam). The district 
court nonetheless allowed the case to go forward on the question of whether the disparate impact 
rule exceeds HUD’s authority to the extent it applies to insurers’ ratemaking and underwriting 
decisions. See Amended Complaint at 17–20, Am. Ins. Ass’n, 74 F. Supp. 3d 30. HUD has moved 
for summary judgment. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Am. Ins. Ass’n, 74 F. Supp. 
3d 30. 
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critique of process, particularly apparent when the target is not “soft” 
guidance but rulemaking. The broader charge is that agencies in their 
regulatory action on sexual assault, gender identity, ex-offenders, or 
housing integration have intruded on intimate domains—domains that 
are better left to states or local communities. And these process 
challenges are likely fueled by a concern about the specific areas in 
which the agencies seek to regulate: substantive matters over which 
there are deep disagreements such as employment of ex-offenders, 
gender identity, and where housing for poor people and minorities 
should be located.  
Indeed, in the end it may be too difficult to disentangle whether 
these challenges are about the goals or the misuse of administrative 
power to achieve those goals. What is clear is that this conflation of 
form and function in challenging the regulatory action of civil rights 
agencies is not entirely new. Long before claims of “sex bureaucracy,” 
or “social engineering” through bureaucracy, opponents challenged 
the DOE for, in effect, promoting a race bureaucracy that sought to 
advance integration in education.64 Prominent scholars have cast the 
work of the EEOC and other agencies in the 1960s and early 1970s, in 
particular with respect to its disparate impact guidance, as a creative 
hijacking of the meaning of 1964 Act. One prominent account argues 
that administrative agencies improperly transformed the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964’s mandate of antidiscrimination and colorblindness into a 
mechanism for advancement of group-based rights.65 Critics charged 
President Richard Nixon’s program of affirmative action in federal 
contracting as a usurpation of congressional power.66 
Connecting current critiques to earlier periods does not dispose of 
legitimate concerns about transparency, participation, and fidelity to 
statutory interpretation. Rather it is meant to suggest that the 
invocation of regulatory power by civil rights agencies has always been 
contested, and those contestations have often surfaced as attacks on 
 
 64. See generally STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY 
OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1995) (articulating some of the criticisms of federal 
actions pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).  
 65. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 456–58 (1990). Scholars have in 
turn questioned Professor Hugh Graham’s assessment. See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Civil Rights 
Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1725 (1991) (book review) (questioning some of Graham’s 
characterizations).  
 66. See J. Larry Hood, The Nixon Administration and the Revised Philadelphia Plan for 
Affirmative Action: A Study in Expanding Presidential Power and Divided Government, 23 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 145, 150–54 (1993) (describing resistance to the “Philadelphia Plan” as 
an unconstitutional usurpation of power away from Congress by the DOL). 
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the misuse of bureaucratic power. These concerns about bureaucracy 
are long-standing and are often difficult to disentangle from resistance 
to substantive goals.  
II.  RETHINKING INCLUSIONARY REGIMES 
This Part shows how, against the backdrop of these concerns about 
bureaucratic overreach, civil rights agencies are retooling conventional 
bureaucratic forms of regulation to advance inclusion. The current 
clamor about the legitimacy of civil rights regulation risks rendering 
agencies more reluctant to use regulatory power. And yet the 
complexity of civil rights problems today and the inefficacy of 
traditional solutions would seem to demand a greater role for agencies 
in developing innovative approaches to advance equality and inclusion.  
This Part provides a positive account of the civil rights regulations 
of the kind described in Part I, which one can see as regulatory 
responses to an emerging set of problems using long-standing informal 
and formal regulatory power. This Part suggests that, although the 
regulatory tools that civil rights agencies are invoking are not 
themselves new, they represent an attempt to address emerging 
problems. To be sure, they occur in a space in which the 
antidiscrimination norms are often contested. Yet functionally they 
serve to catalyze institutions to respond far beyond the regulatory 
space precisely governed by bureaucratic rules. This Part then presses 
beyond these examples to show the emergence of new forms of 
“inclusive regulation” that rely on carrots (grant making) in addition 
to sticks (funding termination); encourage collaborative work with 
regulated actors and communities; engage states, localities, and 
communities in developing context-specific, evolving solutions rather 
than mandating “top-down” solutions; and attempt to collapse 
traditional boundaries between agencies.  
A. Regulatory Responses to Emerging Problems 
The current context of concern over civil rights overreach butts 
against recent scholarly attention to agencies’ distinct role in flexibly 
implementing statutes to respond to emerging problems. 
Commentators have provided positive accounts of civil rights agencies’ 
capacity to use informal and formal regulatory powers to respond to 
emerging problems of exclusion. Professors William Eskridge and 
John Ferejohn’s influential account of the role of statutes in 
instantiating enduring norms features the EEOC’s role in interpreting 
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Title VII to protect women against discrimination based on pregnancy 
in the face of constitutional rulings narrowing such protection.67 
Agencies are celebrated for the capacity to deliberate and develop 
expertise on particular problems. In the area of civil rights, this 
emerges as the ability to engage with social movements to define 
problems as they change and emerge.68 These accounts de-emphasize 
the fear of bureaucratic power, but rather point to the advantages of 
regulatory intervention generally, and in the civil rights area in 
particular. 
More recent agency action can be seen within this lens of 
responsiveness and innovation for which agencies are well suited. In 
addition to engaging with social movements, agencies have the capacity 
to deliberate with regulated entities such as businesses and employers 
not just through the formal process of notice and comment but through 
outreach, interaction, and discussion. Civil rights agencies also have the 
capacity to develop systemic solutions to problems identified through 
individual adjudication or private enforcement in courts.69 Regulated 
entities concerned about individual complaints (in agencies and in 
courts) might look to an agency for guidance in hopes that it functions 
as a “safe harbor” against complaints or to advance inclusionary goals 
that are consistent with the regulated entities’ inclusionary values and 
objectives. 
Much of the recent regulation of civil rights agencies can be seen 
through this framework of innovation, in which agencies are building 
on long-standing tools to develop responses to contemporary problems 
of exclusion. Agencies are not always taking the lead in developing new 
interpretations of existing law. Indeed, courts often play this role. But 
agencies expand the reach of these judicial interpretations through 
rulemaking and guidance.  
 
 67. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 6, at 33–40 (describing the process of 
administrative constitutionalism in which legislative and executive officials advance new 
fundamental principles and policies). 
 68. See, e.g., id. (describing the EEOC’s interaction with women’s groups concerned about 
pregnancy discrimination). See generally LIEBERMAN, supra note 51 (providing an account of the 
EEOC’s interaction with civil rights groups like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to identify 
discriminatory employment barriers); Chen, supra note 4 (detailing the DOE’s interaction with 
immigrant advocacy groups to develop guidelines on education of students with limited English 
proficiency).  
 69. See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 111–45 (1996) 
(describing the development of the EEOC’s “disparate impact” standard as an administrative 
solution to the EEOC’s limited capacity to address systemic complaints). 
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In key instances, agencies are dusting off untapped regulatory 
power. HUD, which has engaged in a range of regulatory activity to 
clarify the FHA, provides an example. Between 2012 and 2016, HUD 
issued the disparate impact rule70 and the rule requiring federal 
grantees to affirmatively further fair housing71 discussed in Part I. In 
addition, HUD formalized its standards for assessing claims of sexual 
harassment under the FHA,72 promulgated rules prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in 
HUD-funded and HUD-operated housing programs,73 and provided 
guidance on the FHA’s application to the use of criminal history in 
making housing decisions in public and federally funded housing.74 
Using regulatory tools that are uncontested, HUD’s actions aim to 
respond to emerging problems. Yet the tools employed—notice-and-
comment rulemaking and enforcement guidance—build on long-
standing regulatory mechanisms.  
Agencies are also responding to a void left by a gridlocked 
Congress.75 Recent regulatory responses to the problem of wage 
disparity provide an example. In recent years, advocates began to 
highlight these problems related to wage disparity, and efforts to 
strengthen legislative protection from wage discrimination have stalled 
in Congress.76 In the void, agencies have begun to craft responses using 
existing regulatory tools in new ways. Specifically, the EEOC has 
proposed amending EEO-1 forms—which have been used to collect 
data on gender, race, and ethnicity—to require collection of pay data 
 
 70. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 71. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (July 16, 2015) 
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903). 
 72. See Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for 
Discriminatory Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,054 (Sept. 
14, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).  
 73. See Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or 
Gender Identity, 77 Fed. Reg. 5,662, 5,662 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 24 CFR Parts 5, 200, 
203, 236, 400, 570, 574, 882, 891, and 982). 
 74. See OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., GUIDANCE 
FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCIES (PHAS) AND OWNERS OF FEDERALLY-ASSISTED HOUSING 
ON EXCLUDING THE USE OF ARREST RECORDS IN HOUSING DECISIONS 1–7 (2015), https://por
tal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=PIH2015-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9W2-F9CZ]. 
 75. For an account of congressional polarization, see Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional 
Congress, 18 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 85, 86 (2015) (reviewing the literature on the causes of 
legislative stalemate and finding that partisanship and electoral competition are undermining 
Congress’s “broader problem-solving capacity”). 
 76. See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 2199, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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for private industry and federal contractors with one hundred or more 
employees.77  
In other examples, agency guidance has the effect of catalyzing 
innovative programs by regulated entities that go beyond the letter of 
the guidance. The sexual assault guidelines provide an example. In the 
area of sexual assault, beyond what the guidance itself requires, schools 
are conducting peer training and education, promoting bystander 
intervention programs, and launching efforts to curb excessive alcohol 
use.78 For some schools, the framework has broadened beyond the 
notion of preventing and providing responses to sexual violence and 
gender-based misconduct to more broadly promote “Sexual Respect 
and Community Citizenship.”79 This framework is meant to move 
beyond a set of responses to individual instances of violence to develop 
a campus climate that promotes participation and inclusion. This 
reveals that agency intervention is not propelled simply by the contours 
of the guidance requirements themselves or the mandates of 
bureaucratic regulation, but from a surrounding context in which 
universities have their own incentives and institutional motivations to 
promote gender inclusion. These motivations might range from 
relatively thin compliance-oriented motivations (such as diminishing 
Title IX complaints or avoiding a Title IX investigation by the DOE). 
But they also may be motivated by a set of thicker motivations that 
align with institutional imperatives, such as improving the learning 
environment for women and other parties affected by sexual violence 
or creating citizens and leaders who understand and are prepared to 
engage with diverse communities. In short, institutions may initially be 
prompted by an agency-driven framework of compliance, but 
 
 77. See Agency Information Collection Activities: Revision of the Employer Information 
Report (EEO-1) and Comment Request, 81 Fed. Reg. 5,113, 5,113 (Feb. 1, 2016). This effort 
stems from a multiagency initiative to determine potential responses to gender-based wage 
disparities. See Presidential Memorandum, Advancing Pay Equality Through Compensation 
Data Collection, 79 Fed. Reg. 20,751, 20,751 (Apr. 11, 2014) (directing the Secretary of Labor to 
develop a compensation data collection proposal). The EEOC proposal is not yet final and is 
opposed by some employers. See Vin Gurrieri, EEOC Gets Polarized Feedback On Rule To Fight 
Wage Gap, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/782449/eeoc-gets-polarized-
feedback-on-rule-to-fight-wage-gap [https://perma.cc/G5YG-Y78R]. 
 78. For a description of sexual assault prevention programs operative at a range of 
institutions, see infra notes 108–11. 
 79. See Sexual Respect and Community Citizenship Initiative 2016, COLUM. UNIV., https://
sexualrespect.columbia.edu/sexual-respect-and-community-citizenship-initiative-2016 [https://
perma.cc/2EDQ-FSWK]. 
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institutions adopt, adapt, and embed commitments that extend further 
than these regulations. 
This is not to diminish all concerns about process, but it is to 
temper them. Some of these forms of federal administrative regulation 
are long-standing and quite “soft” in their use of regulatory power. To 
the extent that they are prompting change, it may be because 
institutions have a broader range of incentives to adopt them than is 
evident simply from the mandates of a coercive regulatory regime.  
B. Rethinking Civil Rights Regimes 
These regulatory responses emerge at a time in which the limits of 
traditional modes of civil rights regulation have become more evident. 
As a general matter, the turn to agencies can be explained as a response 
to the limits of adjudication or complaint resolution as a mechanism of 
advancing systemic change. These limitations are in part the result of 
judicial doctrines that hamper the ability of plaintiffs to recover in 
individual antidiscrimination cases,80 weaken mechanisms such as the 
class action device for systemic change,81 as well as curtail the ability of 
plaintiffs to bring private enforcement actions in court.82 Agency 
regulations thus provide a mechanism for advancing systemic strategies 
for a set of enduring problems that courts or other systems are not 
always well suited to address. The DOE regulations regarding sexual 
assault and harassment on college campuses might be seen in this vein, 
 
 80. For a discussion of the limitations of the antidiscrimination framework in Title VII, see 
Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 85 (2011) (stating that 
“courts largely seem to view discrimination as being motivated by an individual who possesses a 
bad motive”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 467–68 (2001) (describing organizational practices that are 
“difficult to trace directly to intentional discrete actions of particular actors,” such as harassment 
claims between coworkers and exclusion caused by patterns of interaction, informal norms, 
networking, and mentoring); Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 124–25 (2012) (discussing how the sharp division between disparate 
impact and disparate treatment prevents plaintiffs from addressing “structural” workplace 
practices that fit neither the fault-based disparate treatment model or the strict-liability-based 
disparate impact model); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, 
Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1366 
(2009) (referring to the disparate treatment–disparate impact framework of Title VII as “a 
theoretical straitjacket with two arms”). 
 81. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011) (holding that the proposed 
Title VII nationwide class of former and current female employees at Wal-Mart claiming 
discrimination in pay and promotion practices lacked the “commonality” of factual and legal 
claims required to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23). 
 82. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (curtailing the ability of 
plaintiffs to bring enforcement actions). 
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as a response to the limitations of a system of individual complaints (in 
agencies or courts) for addressing or preventing what may be a 
systemic problem on campuses. 
A broader limitation, however, relates not just to efficacy of 
adjudication but to the capacity of the antidiscrimination enforcement 
framework to respond to contemporary problems of exclusion and 
inequality. In part, this reflects the limitation of the antidiscrimination 
framework. In the areas of race and gender exclusion, for instance, it is 
easy to discern a mismatch between the concept of antidiscrimination 
and the mechanisms of exclusion, which might be subtle, implicit, and 
the result of “favoritism” rather than simple bias.83 Further, 
discrimination (even if we incorporate notions of implicit bias) may be 
inadequate to explain exclusion in certain areas. Bias and even 
favoritism are only some of the mechanisms that generate racial and 
gender exclusion. Discrimination interacts with other mechanisms, 
many of which are rooted in long-standing patterns of economic 
exclusion including segregation, access to training and education, and 
social capital networks.84 In the area of housing, for instance, housing 
segregation might be fueled by long-standing and contemporary 
discrimination in private housing markets but also fueled by decisions 
on where to site low-income housing, the crisis of affordability in 
housing, and ostensibly race-neutral barriers such as the availability of 
transportation.  
The limitations of existing antidiscrimination frameworks have 
implications for how agencies might better advance inclusion through 
regulation. First, civil rights agencies may need regulatory systems that 
respond to multiple barriers of exclusion simultaneously. Relatedly, 
agencies may have to develop regulatory responses that connect 
solutions to traditional notions of discrimination—that is, bias—with 
the solutions to problems that extend beyond bias (for example, in the 
areas of employment, addressing skills, social capital, and other 
barriers to inclusion).  
Second, agencies may need in some instances to set inclusionary 
goals without knowing in advance what strategies might best achieve 
those solutions. This builds on the insights of those who emphasize the 
 
 83. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 80, at 460.  
 84. See generally DEIDRE A. ROYSTER, RACE AND THE INVISIBLE HAND: HOW WHITE 
NETWORKS EXCLUDE BLACK MEN FROM BLUE-COLLAR JOBS (2003) (providing an account of 
how discriminatory networks contribute to occupational segregation). 
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need for “experimentation” and responsiveness to local conditions.85 
An agency may require states and localities to share and work to 
achieve a particular end—decreasing housing segregation—but the 
best strategies to achieve that goal might not be fully known in advance 
and may be specific to a local community.  
A final implication is that addressing systemic barriers may 
require agencies to not only prohibit discrimination but also engage an 
affirmative set of strategies for advancing inclusion. Inclusionary 
regimes would need to do more than sanction the paradigm 
noncompliant regulated entities (schools that utterly fail to respond to 
sexual assault, for instance); they would also need to provide tools that 
help those who share inclusionary regulatory goals achieve them. The 
tools for achieving these ends may then differ from the traditional 
enforcement tools of individual complaints, adjudication, 
investigation, and funding termination.  
C. The Emerging Inclusive Regulation 
In the face of the limitations of extant regimes, there is evidence 
that civil rights agencies are adopting regulatory approaches to 
advance inclusion that depart from traditional bureaucratic regulation. 
As discussed below, these approaches include (1) competitive grants to 
support jurisdictions that seek to advance civil rights goals, (2) 
regulatory programs that collapse boundaries between agencies and 
between enforcement and regulation, and (3) greater engagement of 
affected communities in developing and implementing solutions. 
1. From Sticks to Carrots.  One possible implication is that civil 
rights regimes might need to depend on regulatory “carrots” of grant 
making as much as on the prohibitory “sticks” of conditioned spending. 
The federal government widely uses grant making to spur “innovation” 
in design across a range of areas. But civil rights agencies have not 
pervasively used grants in this way.86 Reliance on competitive 
government grant awards to those who seek to advance inclusion could 
encourage innovation to develop new solutions tailored to local 
conditions and expertise. Agencies could use these grant-making 
 
 85. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 21, at 249 (introducing a conceptual framework for inclusion 
that engages “crucial stakeholders and encourage[s] experimentation”). 
 86. There are a few important exceptions to this, most prominently the Magnet Schools 
Assistance Act, which provides grants to states and localities to develop racially and economically 
integrated magnet schools. See 20 U.S.C. § 7231 (2012). 
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programs to provide support to those jurisdictions who seek to advance 
equality goals but require funding incentives and substantive direction 
to effectively move forward.  
An emphasis on competitive grants might build on the framework 
of conditioned spending that currently exists. Conditioned spending is 
at the heart of affirmative action programs—hiring, pay, and 
nondiscrimination requirements placed on employers that receive 
federal contracts.87 Employers receiving covered contracts are required 
to certify compliance with particular requirements, engage in self-
analyses, and submit to systemic reviews and investigations by the 
DOL’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. Contractors 
in violation of the equal-opportunity directives may have their 
contracts canceled, terminated, or suspended.88 Title IX requires 
educational institutions and districts taking federal funds not to 
discriminate on the basis of gender. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prohibits discrimination by all entities that receive federal funds,89 
and the FHA requires the federal government and its grantees to 
“affirmatively further fair housing.”90 These conditioned spending 
 
 87. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-122, § 503, 87 Stat 355, 393–94, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 791 (2012) (requiring federal contractors to develop a plan to employ and advance individuals 
with disabilities); Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971, 42,971 (July 23, 2014) (extending 
Executive Order No. 13,087 to gender identity); Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097, 
30,097 (May 28, 1998) (extending Executive Order No. 11,478 to sexual orientation); Exec. Order 
No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985, 12,985 (Aug. 8, 1969) (extending Exec. Order No. 11,246 to all 
federal employees); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965) 
(mandating, with regard to “race, creed, color, or national origin,” nondiscrimination in the areas 
of “employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff 
or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including 
apprenticeship”); Regulations Implementing Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/section503.htm [https://perma.cc/YX4Q-
RJTR] (describing the requirements for complying with the obligation to hire and advance 
individuals with disabilities); see also Exec. Order No. 13,665, 79 Fed. Reg. 20,749, 20,749 (Apr. 
8, 2014) (amending Executive Order No. 11,246 to prohibit discrimination or discharge by federal 
contractors who inquire about compensation). 
 88. See, e.g., Executive Order 11246—Equal Employment Opportunity, U.S. DEP’T  
OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/aa.htm [https://perma.cc/PB5K-WE7A]. 
Indeed, the DOL’s review and investigation process provides a potentially powerful tool for 
promoting nondiscrimination as well as affirmative action. In recent years, the DOL has identified 
pay and promotion discrimination by federal contractors and brokered remedial settlements. See 
Lahey Clinic Settles Pay Discrimination Case with US Labor Department, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ofccp/OFCCP20142056.htm [https://perma.
cc/NAG6-B3VB].  
 89. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, or national origin in federally funded programs). 
 90. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (July 16, 2015) (to be 
codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903). These directives implement section 
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programs provide nondiscriminatory baseline prohibitions. 
Competitive grants could be deployed in agencies that have spending 
and programmatic authority, specifically in agencies that regulate and 
support programs involving labor, education, and housing. Grants 
could use spending to spur experimentation and to leverage 
government funds to develop new approaches to address inequality. 
There is evidence that civil rights agencies are placing greater 
reliance on competitive grant making of this sort. Under the Obama 
administration, three federal agencies—HUD, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT), and the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)—initiated a “Partnership for Sustainable 
Communities,” which awards state and local grants to build affordable 
housing, redesign transportation infrastructure, and promote 
environmental efficiency, and the Partnership has issued grants to 
support programs in more than twenty-five jurisdictions.91 While the 
DOE’s sexual assault guidance has received the most attention, the 
DOE has also called for grants to higher-education institutions to 
develop innovative responses to problems of sexual assault on campus. 
Similarly, the DOL has announced competitive grants to public-private 
partnerships to “develop and implement innovative, high-
quality . . . apprenticeship programs”92 that move workers into “high-
growth occupations and industries.”93 A key focus of the grant program 
is spurring partnerships that increase training opportunities for 
 
3608 of the FHA, which requires HUD to administer programs “in a manner affirmatively to 
further the policies of [the FHA].” See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012); see also id. § 3608(d) 
(requiring the same of all federal departments and agencies). 
 91. See About Us, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, http://www.sustainable
communities.gov/mission/about-us [https://perma.cc/39AF-MCLX] (describing the goals as using 
“agency resources to advance Ladders of Opportunity for every American and every community 
. . . helping communities adapt to a changing climate, while mitigating future disaster losses . . . 
[and] supporting implementation of community-based development priorities”); List of Case 
Studies, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, https://www.sustainablecommunities
.gov/case-studies [https://perma.cc/AU7W-FDWG] (providing case studies of jurisdictions that 
have launched promising programs with these grants). 
 92. Opportunities, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/featured/cwip/opportunities 
[https://perma.cc/XR6X-ZXNA]. The grant competition will “focus on public–private 
partnerships between employers, business associations, joint labor-management organizations, 
labor organizations, training providers, community colleges, local and state governments, the 
workforce system, non-profits and faith-based organizations.” Id. 
 93. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS AND FUNDING 
OPPORTUNITY ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE AMERICAN APPRENTICESHIP INITIATIVE, https://
www.dol.gov/dol/grants/FOA-ETA-15-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C2M-MQQ3] (describing a 
reward of up to $100 million in grants financed by a user fee generated by the H-1B nonimmigrant 
visa program). 
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historically excluded groups including women, people with disabilities, 
and people of color.94 Another DOL grant program awards grants to 
innovative approaches to training low-skilled and historically excluded 
workers for employment in the technology industry.95  
In addition to leveraging government funds to develop new 
strategies for inclusion, the approach evident in programs such as the 
DOL grant program and the Partnership for Sustainable Communities 
provides the advantage of “pooling” agency resources to meet multiple 
goals.96 For instance, in the area of employment this might include both 
providing skills training for workers and advancing inclusion of 
particular groups. In the area of housing, it would include both building 
affordable housing and advancing the civil rights goals of 
nondiscrimination and integration.  
Yet another example involves the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
efforts to address the civil rights implications of municipal fines that 
target the poor. Alongside the DOJ investigations and settlement 
agreements prohibiting excessive court fines for misdemeanor arrests 
and quality-of-life violations,97 the DOJ established a $2.5 million 
program to help state and local courts develop new policies.98  
These grant-making efforts do not yet dispense large amounts of 
funding. And as discussed in Part III, below, their capacity will depend 
on the quality of the initiatives they develop, the efficacy of oversight, 
 
 94. See Opportunities, supra note 92. 
 95. See DOL Grants: Funding Opportunities, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/
dol/grants/funding-ops.htm [https://perma.cc/MHD6-6SBS] (announcing $100 million in grants to 
support innovative approaches to moving lower-skilled workers on the fastest paths to well-
paying information-technology and high-growth jobs in industries like healthcare, advanced 
manufacturing, financial services, and other in-demand sectors).  
 96. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 211 (2015) (“[T]he 
executive creates joint structures capable of ends that no single agency could otherwise achieve.”). 
Professor Daphna Renan also provides some reasons to be cautious about the agency “pooling” 
approach from the perspective of administrative law and design. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–15 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VF36-JGJX] (detailing the DOJ’s finding that law enforcement’s focus on maximizing 
revenue imposes hardship on the city’s low-income residents and has a disproportionate impact 
on African Americans); Consent Decree at 83–86, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-
000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016) (enumerating elements of the settlement agreement 
between the DOJ and the City of Ferguson).  
 98. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Announces Resources to Assist State and Local Reform of Fine and Fee Practices  
(Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-resources-assist-
state-and-local-reform-fine-and-fee-practices [https://perma.cc/6CJV-S8JF]. 
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and the development of systems for diffusing the benefits of effective 
solutions. Still, they suggest a promising emerging approach for using 
federal grants that provide incentives and financial support to state and 
local programs to further statutory and regulatory goals (such as 
integration in housing). 
2. Collapsing Boundaries.  The limitations of existing civil rights 
regimes also call for collapsing traditional boundaries between 
agencies addressing different substantive domains and rethinking 
boundaries between agency functions. This is not just a question of 
bureaucratic reorganization. Addressing problems of exclusion might 
involve attending to multiple interrelated barriers that affect 
communities and individuals, areas that may be the domain of more 
than one agency. As an example, racial segregation affects the health 
and environmental well-being of communities as well as access to 
quality education. Promoting integration may require addressing 
transportation, housing, and access to employment.  
There is evidence of this collaboration across domains in recent 
federal programmatic initiatives. The Partnership for Sustainable 
Communities (referenced in the prior subsection as an example of an 
increasing emphasis on grants as a source of equality innovation) 
combines grant making and oversight across agencies so that recipients 
of grants are able to draw on the expertise of multiple agencies and 
attend to intersecting barriers and problems facing communities.99 
Another aspect of the collaboration is the development of 
“sustainability” indicators that communities can use to measure 
community well-being related to land use, housing, human health, 
transportation, and the environment.100 The programmatic design 
stems from the reality that achieving sustainable communities cannot 
simply result from regulation in one substantive area but requires 
addressing barriers that are within the purview of different agencies 
and regulatory regimes.  
Next, beyond substantive boundaries, solving emerging and 
embedded problems of inequity may involve collapsing the traditional 
divide between antidiscrimination enforcement and programmatic 
regulation. Civil rights offices of agencies involved in complaint 
 
 99. For further discussion of the Partnership for Sustainable Communities, see supra note 91 
and accompanying text. 
 100. Sustainable Community Indicator Catalog, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE 
COMMUNITIES, https://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/indicators [https://perma.cc/RD7M-
ZWJY]. 
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resolution would need to consider questions of program design—how 
agency programs might be designed and structured to promote 
inclusion. Similarly, if addressing barriers to inclusion involves 
attending to bias in addition to other impediments that individuals and 
communities face, this calls for dissolving barriers between 
independent agencies traditionally dedicated to antidiscrimination 
enforcement (such as the EEOC) and agencies that regulate to further 
broader federal policy goals (such as the DOL, responsible for training 
and preparing the workforce).  
Recent agency initiatives are beginning to collapse the boundaries 
between ex post enforcement of violations and ongoing regulation and 
programmatic design. The guidance on spending programs and agency 
equality directives exemplify this feature. For instance, the DOE’s 
efforts to address sexual assault and violence on campus center not 
simply on resolving complaints or providing guidance on the procedure 
for adjudicating campus sexual assault but on encouraging institutions 
to adopt practices to prevent sexual assault. The DOE furthers these 
goals through trainings, technical assistance, publications, and 
solicitation for grants to support inclusive, preventive practices.  
Regulatory implementation of the FHA’s statutory mandate to 
affirmatively further fair housing provides another example.101 The 
AFFH rule seeks to achieve fair housing goals, not through HUD’s 
powers over adjudication or its power to delineate the prohibitory 
scope of the fair housing act, but through a system in which 
communities and regulated entities (state and local housing agencies) 
identify the processes that sustain discrimination and segregation and 
take steps to address the identified problems.  
Yet another example is found in the design of the DOL’s 
apprenticeship initiatives. The program is designed to achieve ends 
that are related to workforce development generally and not civil rights 
goals in particular. The DOL’s program is aimed at creating industry- 
and government-developed high-quality apprenticeship programs for 
training workers in industries that are growing in particular regions. In 
seeking proposals, the DOL makes inclusion not a matter for ex post 
enforcement (through complaints or DOL compliance reviews of those 
receiving federal grants) but a matter of front-end design. The DOL’s 
grants establish inclusion of underrepresented groups (in particular 
 
 101. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012) (requiring HUD to “administer the programs and 
activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the 
policies of [the FHA]”). 
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women) as a substantive goal. The program seeks to provide strategies 
for all grantees to develop inclusive practices and provides grants to 
“intermediaries” (community-based organizations, labor 
organizations, and workforce organizations) to develop regional 
partnerships to increase opportunities for women, racial and ethnic 
minorities, people with disabilities, and other traditionally underserved 
groups.102 
3. Participation and “Crowd-Sourced” Solutions.  The changing 
civil rights context also suggests the need to engage regulated entities 
(employers, schools, and state and local governments) as well as 
affected communities in devising and implementing solutions to civil 
rights problems. The barriers to inclusion may differ in different 
regions. For instance, the form and sustaining mechanisms of housing 
segregation may differ between growing metropolitan areas and older 
industrial cities. Solutions may also differ in different regions. In the 
area of housing segregation, the tools available to expanding, relatively 
affluent areas experiencing growth may differ from those in smaller, 
shrinking cities.103  
The reasons that regulated entities fail to effectuate inclusion may 
also differ. Civil rights violators include the hostilely noncompliant as 
well as the ineffectual. Sexual assaults may occur on campuses resistant 
to adopting any role in responding to complaints, as well as those that 
with good intentions advance programs and policies that prove 
ineffective. Participation of regulated entities may advance tailored 
approaches and development of broadly effective solutions. In this 
way, participation can be consistent with emphasizing front-end design 
to advance inclusion, rather than ex post enforcement. 
Participation of affected communities also provides deeper 
understanding of the scope of a particular problem and a pathway to 
more effective solutions. Further, organizational theory tells us that 
participation in design and implementation allows regulated entities to 
connect the inclusionary regulatory goal to their own institutional 
 
 102. See ApprenticeshipUSA Investments, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/ 
featured/apprenticeship/grants [https://perma.cc/2W84-SGGJ] (describing grants to “National 
Equity Partners” who would be responsible for developing regional “opportunity partnerships” 
across the nation, intended to “increase gender, racial, ethnic and other demographic diversity 
and inclusion in apprenticeships, among traditionally underrepresented populations”). 
 103. See, e.g., William H. Frey, Mid-Decade, Big City Growth Continues, BROOKINGS (May 
23, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/05/23/mid-decade-big-city-growth-
continues [https://perma.cc/XWH8-XFET] (documenting the continuing growth of large cities). 
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objectives. The theory is that participation in developing and 
implementing specific strategies allows regulated entities to “buy in” 
to the regulatory goals and strategies and allows remedies to better 
stick.104 
This emphasis on participation is evident in the new HUD AFFH 
regulation. A key part of strengthening the rules requiring state and 
local governments to advance fair housing was the development of an 
assessment tool in which grantees would, with HUD’s assistance, assess 
the barriers to fair housing in their communities.105 In identifying 
regional fair housing issues and setting goals, grantees must engage in 
a structured “community participation process” in which they consult 
with community groups and citizens.106 
The DOE’s guidance on sexual assault and violence provides 
another example. Though the DOE’s guidance calls for participation 
with much less specific direction than in the AFFH context, the 
guidance appears to be spurring schools to develop programs that 
extend beyond the boundaries of the guidance. Specifically, the DOE’s 
guidance calls for higher-education institutions to adopt training, 
education programs, and materials for the school population and 
generally targeted audiences (for example, new students and 
athletes).107 This guidance appears to be catalyzing schools to adopt a 
range of initiatives beyond the formal requirements of the guidance, 
including vigorous counseling and support;108 peer training panels and 
 
 104. This is the key insight of the “new governance” literature. See generally Charles F. Sabel 
& William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of 
Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (2012) (discussing the emergence 
of regulatory regimes that structure engagement by various stakeholders to address public 
problems whose solutions have been hampered by ignorance or uncertainty).  
 105. See The Assessment of Fair Housing, HUD EXCHANGE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN 
DEV., https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/affh/overview [https://perma.cc/AN2H-4MGV] 
(“The rule identifies four fair housing issues that program participants will assess: 1. Patterns of 
integration and segregation; 2. Racially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty; 3. Disparities 
in access to opportunity; and 4. Disproportionate housing needs.”). 
 106. See 24 C.F.R. § 91.100 (2016). The regulation states:  
The jurisdiction shall consult with community-based and regionally-based 
organizations that represent protected class members, and organizations that enforce 
fair housing laws, such as State or local fair housing enforcement agencies (including 
participants in the Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP)), fair housing 
organizations and other nonprofit organizations that receive funding under the Fair 
Housing Initiative Program (FHIP), and other public and private fair housing service 
agencies, to the extent that such entities operate within its jurisdiction. 
Id.; see also id. § 91.105 (detailing citizen-participation requirements for local governments). 
 107. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 27. 
 108. See Campus Choice, S. OR. UNIV., https://inside.sou.edu/campuschoice/index.html [https
://perma.cc/X55K-3GLD].  
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discussion groups to move toward cultures of “consent,” “respect,” and 
“empowerment”;109 harnessing higher-educational institutional 
capacity to conduct research on campus climate and effective 
practices;110 and offering trainings that move beyond standard sexual 
assault prevention strategies by allowing students to engage visual arts, 
dance, media, and theater to express more comprehensive themes of 
sexual identity and respect.111  
III.  REGIME FOR THE FUTURE? 
The central aim of this Article is to bring to the fore these new 
modes of agency regulation. The question ultimately is whether the 
emerging inclusive regulatory regime will be meaningful and effective. 
There is too much uncertainty in the current political moment to fully 
predict the immediate fate of the guidance documents and regulations 
discussed in this Article. Both traditional and innovative forms of civil 
rights regulation depend on enforcement, as well as programmatic and 
financial support from the federal government. At the same time, some 
of the innovations—such as those involving sexual assault reforms in 
higher-education institutions—are currently underway,112 and some 
aspects may continue even in the absence of federal guidance.  
However, this Article’s interest in understanding the potential and 
limitations of this new inclusive regulation transcends the current 
political moment. The question is what place models that take this 
mode of regulation have in civil rights. The new inclusive regulation 
emphasizes participation, problem-solving, and solutions that are not 
mandated but generated through the iterative process of 
implementation. This model is thus open to the critique that it is 
insufficiently directive and too precatory.  
One can use the example of the AFFH rule, which has been 
subject to the criticism that it is too coercive.113 In his confirmation 
 
 109. See, e.g., Creating a Culture of Consent, HARVARD UNIV., http://osapr.harvard.edu/
creating-culture-consent [https://perma.cc/7YMD-UVN7]. 
 110. See, e.g., UT System to Launch the Most Comprehensive Sexual Assault Study in Higher 
Education, UNIV. OF TEXAS SYS. (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.utsystem.edu/news/2015/08/05/ut-
system-launch-most-comprehensive-sexual-assault-study-higher-education [https://perma.cc/GT
8J-FVKW]. 
 111. See, e.g., Sexual Respect & Community Citizenship Initiative: The Arts Option, COLUM. 
UNIV., http://artsoption.columbia.edu [https://perma.cc/BL2M-E9VC]. 
 112. For a description of efforts underway at higher-education institutions, see supra notes 
108–11. 
 113. For critiques of the AFFH rule as too coercive, see supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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hearing, incoming Secretary of HUD Ben Carson echoed these 
critiques, describing the rule as an example of “people sitting around 
desks in Washington, D.C., deciding how things should be done” at the 
local level.114 At the hearing, Senator Robert Menendez challenged this 
characterization of the rule, stating the AFFH rule was not “top-down” 
and instead “requires local communities to assess their own patterns of 
racial and income segregation and make genuine plans to address 
them.”115 Indeed, the AFFH rule’s heavy reliance on the development 
of flexible, locally developed solutions116 has drawn criticism that it 
contains insufficient directives to localities to abolish practices that, 
over the last forty years, have been proven to have exclusionary effects 
(such as exclusionary zoning).117 HUD’s own explanation of the AFFH 
rule concedes that this flexibility will lead to indeterminate 
outcomes.118  
A more general critique is that any move toward voluntary and 
competitive grants, collaboration, and tailored problem-solving 
depends on shared inclusionary goals. As the discussion in Part I 
reveals, inclusionary goals are not shared; indeed, they are deeply 
contested. The success of this mode of regulation would require 
baseline norms of antidiscrimination that apply to a broad array of 
public and private entities, as well as the support and encouragement 
of institutions that seek to extend inclusion beyond these norms. 
Whether this is desirable depends on how broadly one defines the 
baseline civil rights requirements. If nondiscrimination is interpreted 
to require furthering fair housing, and if one knows the best strategy 
for advancing that goal throughout jurisdictions, it is hard to see the 
 
 114. Nomination of Dr. Benjamin Carson Hearing, supra note 10, at 13–14 (testifying further 
that he had no problem with integration but did have a “problem with people on high dictating it 
when they don’t know anything about what’s going on in the area”). 
 115. Id. at 17 (statement of Sen. Robert Menendez). 
 116. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,272 (July 16, 2015) 
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903) (noting that the AFFH process 
allows for flexibility in setting goals, prioritizing outcomes, and developing measurement 
standards).  
 117. See, e.g., Lauren Gurley, The Fair Housing Failure—Where Even the Liberal North 
Whistles Dixie, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 6, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/fair-housing-failure
%E2%80%94where-even-liberal-north-whistles-dixie [https://perma.cc/8MNR-4UNZ] (quoting 
a fair housing advocate who believes that the AFFH framework is too weak to undo segregated 
housing patterns and that HUD should emphasize stronger enforcement through the withholding 
of federal funds to counter “massive resistance to changing the segregated status quo”).  
 118. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,272 (noting that the AFFH 
process will encourage communities to plan ahead). 
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justification for not mandating that all entities that receive federal 
funds work meaningfully to achieve that goal.  
The risk of these new modes of regulation is the production of 
places with thick forms of inclusion, alongside those with thin inclusion. 
Imagine a jurisdiction actively enforcing AFFH, receiving a 
sustainability grant to link environmental, housing, and transportation 
services and promoting public-private apprenticeship programs to 
train a diverse set of workers. Next to it might lie a jurisdiction adhering 
to basic nondiscrimination requirements and nothing more. The 
normative justification for allowing such variation among regions given 
the goals and values at stake is not easy to articulate. 
If the new mode of regulation is to hold promise, it will depend on 
vigorous oversight by the federal government, which includes 
monitoring local plans for progress towards inclusionary goals, study 
of effective practices and interventions across jurisdictions, and 
meaningful mechanisms for disseminating understanding of what 
works and the benefits of adopting these more robust forms of 
inclusion. 
This mode of regulation also depends on engagement by public 
and private actors at the state and local levels. A potential virtue of 
inclusive regulation is that it diffuses implementation authority away 
from the federal government to subnational government actors. For 
instance, the AFFH rule requires governments to self-assess and 
develop solutions to problems of fair housing.119 This may serve to 
increase subnational capacity to deliberate, evaluate, and address 
barriers to inclusion. Inclusive regulations’ dependence on 
participation can also build similar capacity among local community 
and civil rights groups. These groups become part of the policymaking 
process and may then have the expertise, information, and political 
networks necessary to hold regulated entities accountable. 
 Still, even with vigorous implementation the model is likely to 
produce variation among jurisdictions. In some sense, this variation is 
a concession to a second-best form of regulation: in the context of 
resistance to civil rights goals, more specific delineation of 
requirements is politically unlikely. However, these new modes of 
regulation create a space for those jurisdictions and entities who seek 
to do more in a climate of concern about over-regulation.  
 
 119. See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Any conclusion must return to where this Article begins: the 
future of civil rights regulation to advance inclusion is uncertain. Both 
“new” and “old” forms of civil rights regulation may now be threatened 
as too expansive and coercive. Beyond the mode of relegation, the 
inclusionary goals may not have the support of an incoming 
presidential administration. Further, some of the specific programs on 
which these inclusive regulations depend may not receive funding in 
the current federal budget.120 Still, it is worth highlighting the promise 
generated by agencies endeavoring to address difficult problems by 
using their power in new ways. If these ideas are not taken up in the 
immediate future, perhaps they will be revisited before too long. 
 
 120. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AMERICA FIRST: 
A BUDGET BLUEPRINT TO MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN (2017), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BUDGET-2018-BLUEPRINT/pdf/BUDGET-2018-BLUEPRINT.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF
2J-F8VC] (proposing eliminating funding for HUD’s Community Development Block Grant 
program). 
